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JACQUELIEN VAN STEKELENBURG
One of the most fascinating and puzzling fea-
tures of collective action is the fact that people
undertake potentially high-risk protests with
little likelihood of reward. Take the widespread
protests of early October 1989 in East Ger-
many with high chances of repression and low
chances of success. Why are people time and
again prepared to participate in protests?
This question refers to the so-called collec-
tive action problem. Collective action prob-
lems arise in relation to public goods because
they attract free riders who consume but do
not contribute to the production of public
goods. Why were the thousands of East Ger-
mans prepared to overcome this free rider
dilemma? The literature identifies two main
answers (Olson 1965). The first explains par-
ticipation in terms of collective incentives, a
combination of individual demands for pub-
lic goods and perceptions of individual and
group efficacy. The second explains participa-
tion in terms of selective incentives, benefits that
participants – participants only – derive from
the activity itself, irrespective of whether they
manage to provide the public good or not.
Selective incentives are classified according
to the different ways in which they affect peo-
ple’s motives and actions (e.g., Marwell &
Oliver 1993; Opp, Voss, & Gern 1995). Mate-
rial incentives are payments or incentives for
participating or coercion for not participat-
ing. Social incentives are benefits or costs of
participating (or not) arising from relation-
ships with other people, either their respect
and honor, or the communal pleasures of
doing things together. Moral incentives arise
from the internal feeling of doing the right
thing. A person acting on moral incentives can
expect a sense of self-esteem, and approval or
even admiration. People take a free ride on
the collective good unless selective incentives
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propel them to protest participation. Olson
(1965) emphasized material incentives as the
logics of action,whereas scholars such asChong
(1991) andOpp,Voss, andGern (1995) empha-
sized social and moral incentives. Note that
Olson did not argue that people participate in
social movements out of rational self-interest.
He acknowledged that moral attitudes could
mobilize to the extent they provide selective
incentives, but, he argued, it is not possible to
get empirical proof of the motivations behind
these “soft” incentives (1965: 61, n.17). Nowa-
days, moral incentives and motivations can be
and aremeasured (e.g., Gross 1995; Opp, Voss,
&Gern 1995; Verba, Schlozman, &Brady 1995;
Muhlberger 2000; Van Stekelenburg, Klander-
mans, & Van Dijk 2009). They appear to be
of utmost importance in explaining protest
participation.
People participate in protest because they
see it as an opportunity to change a state of
affairs they are unhappywith at affordable costs
(instrumental route), or because they identify
with the others involved (identification route),
or because they want to express their values
and their anger with a target that violates their
values (ideology route, cf. Klandermans 2004).
The literature suggests efficacy and selective
incentives (Olson 1965; Klandermans 1984) as
the logics of action in the instrumental route.
The feeling of being able to make a difference
combined with selective incentives helps to
lower the costs and increase the benefits of
participation. Social incentives: commitment,
respect and honor, and communal pleasures of
doing things together, are the logic of action in
the identification route (Stu¨rmer et al. 2003).
Moral incentives function as the logic of action
in the ideological route. Violated (sacred) val-
ues generate moral outrage propelling people
into action to express their views (Jasper 1997).
Themore a political or social “wrong” is against
people’s principles and values, the more they
feel obliged to defend their subjective moral
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boundaries (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans,
& Van Dijk 2009).
In taking the instrumental route people have
to overcome the free rider dilemma, but the
identification and ideological route generate
an inner obligation that helps to overcome this
dilemma – even though the two routes cre-
ate an inner obligation for different reasons.
Maintaining one’s moral integrity may incite
an innermoral obligation to oneself , versus the
inner social obligation to other groupmembers
incited by group identification (Stu¨rmer et al.
2003). These obligations release an energizing
force if and only if one participates, and there-
fore make free riding less likely. Hence, one
might take a free ride on the production of a
collective good, but one cannot take a free ride
on one’s own inner obligation.
With these insights in mind, let me conclude
by returning to the East German protesters
of early October 1989. Opp, Voss, and
Gern (1995) demonstrate that social and
moral incentives especially helped them to
overcome the fear of repression and negligible
success probability. Successful collective action
requires an ever-changing mix of material,
social, and moral incentives that work together
to overcome collective action problems, and
hence, dependent on the sociopolitical context,
a different mix of incentives may motivate
people to protest.
SEE ALSO: Collective efficacy; Free rider
problem; Mechanisms; Rational choice theory
and social movements; Selective incentives;
Social and solidary incentives.
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